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  ABSTRACT 
 
This article conducts a value chain analysis of smallholder burley tobacco production in Malawi 
for  the  2003/04  and  2009/10  agricultural  seasons.    The  comparison  suggests  in  2003/04 
smallholder profits from growing burley were limited by two main factors: first, the practices of 
leaf merchant companies on the auction floors who operated as a cartel (and governed the 
burley  supply  thread);  and  secondly,  by  inefficient  marketing  arrangements.  By  the  2009/10 
season the rents, governance and systemic efficiency within the supply thread had changed 
considerably: there was greater competition on the auction floors largely due  to direct state 
intervention  (which  increased  growers’  net  margins  in  nominal  terms),  improvements  in 
marketing arrangements, tighter state regulation (including the introduction of minimum prices 
for grades of burley) and increased systemic efficiency (through a rapid expansion of contract 
farming). The article concludes by highlighting some of the opportunities and threats that this 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With  the  unravelling  of  flue-cured  tobacco  production  on  estates  in  nearby 
Zimbabwe, Malawi has taken the unenviable mantle of being the world’s most tobacco-reliant 
economy with the crop contributing roughly 60 percent of foreign exchange earnings in recent 
years. But in contrast to Zimbabwe before its political crisis, Malawi’s tobacco production is now 
dominated  by  smallholders,  not  estates.  Whilst  the  Malawi  Congress  Party  (MCP)  under 
President Kamuzu Banda pursued an estate-based development strategy from the late 1960s to 
around 1990 (when the two most lucrative types of tobacco – flue cured and burley – were 
reserved  exclusively  for  the  estate  sub  sector),  since  1990  smallholders  have  grown  an 
increasing proportion of burley (an air-cured tobacco, used as a cheap filler in American-blend 
cigarettes) (see Orr, 2000; Van Donge, 2002; Jaffee, 2003; Peters, 2006).
 1  Smallholders have 
grasped this opportunity. By the end of the 1990s smallholders were growing 60% of national 
burley production (averaging about 120,000 metric tonnes), with this production concentrated in 
Kasungu district, Central Region, and Rumphi district, Northern Region (see Prowse, 2009).  
 
Although  the  shift  from  estate  to  smallholder  burley  production  has  generated 
plenty  of  academic  interest  (Tobin  and  Knausenberger,  1998;  Orr,  2000;  van  Donge,  2002; 
Jaffee,  2003;  Peters,  2006;  Negri  and  Porto,  2008),  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the 
dynamics within the burley value chain. There may be good reasons for this. For example, early 
academic work was precipitated by the two donor agencies who promoted burley reform in the 
1990s: the World Bank and USAID (for example, see Diagne et al 1996; Zeller et al 1998). By 
the early 2000s most donor agencies had formally  distanced themselves from the sector. It 
appears that  the Framework Convention  on Tobacco Control and tobacco’s reputation as a 
pariah crop led donors to engage less with the industry. A good example comes from a senior 
DfID employee, who, when asked about the backbone of the Malawian economy, stated bluntly 
‘we do not do tobacco’.   
  
This article uses primary research and secondary sources to conduct a value chain 
analysis  of  smallholder  burley  production  from  seed  through  to  export  (Gereffi  and 
Korzeniewicz, 1994; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000). The article compares the smallholder burley 
supply thread for the 2003/04 and 2009/10 agricultural seasons to highlight the changes to the 
institutional  framework,  rents,  governance  and  systemic  efficiency.  Primary  research  was 
conducted  in  Lilongwe  and  Kasungu  district  between  August  2002  and  June  2004  utilising 
household surveys, participatory rural appraisal techniques, semi-structured interviews, focus 
group  discussions  and  ethnography.    Two  further  short  research  trips  to  Lilongwe  were 
conducted in 2010.  
 
The article consists of five further sections. The first discusses the particular value 
chain  approach  utilised.  The  second  section  offers  a  brief  overview  of  smallholder  burley 
                                                 
1 From 1961 until 1968 (with political independence in 1964) the Malawian government’s main tobacco 
policy was to promote smallholder production on communal land (Kydd 1984, Mkandawire 1999).  In 
addition to being a political pay-off to the rural supporters of the MCP, the promotion of smallholder 
production was also a response to the increased growth of ‘progressive’ peasant production of cash crops 
in the 1950s (Kydd, 1984). Whilst the pro-peasant policies of the 1960s did elicit growth in communal land 
production, government was confronted by a lack of a sustained supply response (Mkandawire 1999). In 
1968 Malawi faced a severe current account deficit (Baker 1962, Thomas 1975), and as nationalist hostility 
to the estate sub sector, so vehement in the early 1960s, began to wane (McCracken 1984), the estate 
sub sector began to be seen a future source of growth (see Pryor and Chipeta, 1990).   
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production and marketing, and introduces the key actors in the industry in 2003/04. The third 
section discusses the institutional framework, rents, governance and systemic efficiency of the 
supply thread in 2003/04. The fourth section performs the same tasks for the 2009/10 season. 
The fifth section compares the structure and performance of the value chain across these two 
time periods. The article concludes by discussing current challenges within the tobacco sector 
and highlights some of the opportunities and threats that contract farming poses smallholder 
producers. 
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2.  APPROACH TO VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS 
 
      Value chain analysis has become a reasonably popular, if contested, heuristic tool 
in the social sciences and in development studies in particular. It attempts to map the spectrum 
of  activities  in  the  creation  of  a  product.  Typically,  value  chain  analysis  tracks  a  single 
commodity from basic constituent materials, initial production, through primary (and perhaps 
further) trading and processing, to possible export and consumption. In other words, a value 
chain can be defined as:  
 
      “the process by which technology is combined with material and labour inputs, and 
then processed inputs are assembled, marketed and distributed. A single firm may 
consist of one link in this process, or it may be extensively vertically integrated” 
(Kogut, 1985 in Gereffit et al, 2005, p.79).  
 
      Within development studies, the approach has mainly been utilised by academics 
and  practitioners  to  gain  insights  about  the  benefits  and  costs  of  economic  restructuring 
associated with globalisation (see Gereffi 1999; Gereffi et al, 2005).
2 The key point here is that 
value chains have become more complex as increases in efficiency now occur not at one point 
in the value chain, but through increasing co-ordination of different components of the chain 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000).
3  
 
      Similar trends have occurred in many agricultural value chains. These have tended 
to become increasingly buyer-driven and vertically integrated due to both changing patterns of 
demand and supply. For example, on the demand side, population growth, income growth in 
emerging economies, greater urbanisation, greater female participation in the workforce, and 
increasingly  discerning,  quality-focused  consumers  have  contributed  to  greater  vertical 
integration (see Catelo and Costales, 2008; Giovanucci et al, 2008). On the supply side, the 
liberalisation  of  national  marketing  and  international  trade,  the  collapse  of  international 
commodity  agreements,  increased  product  differentiation  due  to  niche  market  requirements, 
and  the  greater  importance  of  public  and  private  standards  (for  both  product  and  process 
attributes) have led to greater levels of buyer control (see Humphrey and Memodovic, 2008; 
Swinnen  and  Maertens,  2009).  Thus,  agricultural  commodity  chains  have  become  more 
integrated,  globalised  and  consumer  driven,  referred  to  as  the  ‘industrialisation’  of  global 
agriculture.
4  Instead  of  supplying  an  array  of  generic,  standardised  commodities,  agriculture 
now supplies highly-differentiated products fulfilling different niche requirement where lead firms 
exact strict demands on suppliers often through vertical co-ordination (see Daviron and Gibbon, 
2002;  Ponte,  2002).  However,  mapping  the  full  range  of  activities  in  the  production  of  a 
commodity is a complex endeavour – if one attempts to trace the origins of all components in a 
finished article (such as packaging, printing, and items used in processing and transportation). 
The next section thus outlines the particular value chain approach utilised here.  
 
      A  more  feasible  approach  than  a  full  value  chain  analysis  is  to  investigate  a 
particular  filiere  or  value  thread  (Sturgeon,  2001).  Value  threads  focus  on  one  specific 
‘ingredient’ in the final commodity. It reduces the breadth of focus, and focuses attention on the 
most important ingredient  – in this case, burley tobacco leaves  – thus ignoring  wider  value 
threads (such as tracing agrochemicals, and materials for processing and packaging).  
                                                 
2 Changes in trade regulations, communication technology and international finance has led to patterns of 
flexible accumulation with a new international division of labour and increasing complexity in terms of 
ownership and governance. 
3 For example, manufactured products are now assembled from components that are spatially separated, 
leading to just-in-time production techniques, low inventory stocks and a reduced levels of capital goods 
for lead firms (Harvey 1990). 
4 Reardon et al (2010) outline how this process occurred first in wholesaling, then in processing, and more 
recently in retailing (as seen through the increasing market power of supermarkets) over the past twenty 
five years.  
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      A second important distinction relates not to breadth, but to length. In many cases 
it is hard to map one value thread in its entirety due to spatial or commercial reasons. Instead, it 
is often more straightforward to map the full value thread minus the activities of the lead firm in 
that chain – referred to as a supply chain. For export crops, this approach necessitates mapping 
the supply chain from seed through to landed cost in the country or region of consumption (or 
further  processing).  Of  course,  decapitating  an  agricultural  value  chain  in  this  manner  can 
ignore important actors, especially  in a buyer-driven chain. It also tends to marginalise vital 
trade  issues.  However,  such  a  supply  chain  approach  draws  a  clear  boundary  around  the 
research,  limiting  the  focus  mainly  to  intra-country  production,  marketing,  processing  and 
export.  
 
      Third, we analyse the supply thread in terms of four components: the institutional 
framework; rents;  governance;  and  systemic  efficiency.  The  institutional  framework  refers  to 
external actors who exert influence on the chain.
5 The central point here is that each value 
chain is embedded within multiple national, regional and global regulatory frameworks. At the 
national  level,  actors  in  supply  threads  are  meant  to  adhere  to  government  regulations 
regarding licensing, taxation, as well product and process standards.  At each node in the value 
chain, actors are often agglomerated into unions or organisations which regulate membership 
and represent their members’ interests. At the regional level and global level, actors can be 
seen to be subject to two regimes. First, multilateral trade agreements and frameworks (such as 
World  Trade  Organisation,  European  Union,  or,  in  our  example  here,  Common  Market  for 
Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  regulations),  as  well  as  bilateral  trade  reciprocity.  Second,  the 
influence  of  regional  and  global  product  and  process  standards,  such  as  classification  and 
grading norms, and certain ‘credence’ factors such as organic or fair-trade practices (or a lack 
of child labour) (see Giovanucci and Purcell, 2008).  
 
      Rents  are  the  returns  realised  by  chain  actors  through  their  involvement  in  the 
chain. The most accurate proxy for rents are the profit rates at each node, but as these are 
frequently difficult to calculate or access, the metric of ‘value added’ can be used to show the 
distribution of value along a supply thread (Gereffi et al 2001). The extent to which actors are 
able to realise rents is through their ability to insulate themselves from competition (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2000).
6  Importantly, rents are often created through strategies that create scarcity 
and  ensure  a  higher  rate  of  return  than  competitors,  especially  through  creating  barriers  to 
entry. In general, agricultural commodity chains have very low barriers to entry for production, 
but high barriers in processing and export segments (and later in the high-value marketing, 
design, branding and retail stages).  There are two main channels through which barriers are 
created. First, innovation and upgrading.
7 Second, through strategies to limit competition. One 
example is the creation of cartels in key markets. Such cartels are usually formed because of 
two main sets of factors: natural causes of largeness, and firm-created causes of largeness 
                                                 
5 As Raikes et al (2002) note, early value chain analysis did not systematically consider the influence of 
regulation on the distribution of rents in a chain, or changes to the governance structure. One exception to 
this is Dolan et al (1999).  
6 It is worthwhile highlighting four possible different sources of rent highlighted by Kaplinsky and Morris 
(2000). First, resource rents can be generated by accessing scare natural resources. Second, classical 
rents are internal to, and can be constructed by, the farm/firm through technological, human resource, 
organisational  or  marketing  superiority.  Third,  relational  rents  can  be  generated  through  improved 
relationships with other chain actors. And fourth, exogenous rents can be generated through the policy, 
infrastructure and financial environment.  
7 Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) suggest that any attempt at categorising innovation and upgrading needs to 
include both intra-node changes as well as intra-segment or intra-thread changes. In this respect, four 
‘typical’ trajectories pursued by firms/farms are highlighted (p.38): process upgrading (through increasing 
internal  efficiency  processes  above  those  of  rivals  both  within  nodes,  and  within  segments);    product 
upgrading (developing new products or improving old products faster than rivals);  functional upgrading 
(altering the sequence and nature of activities within the firm/farm, or changing activities to a higher node 
in the supply thread); chain upgrading  (moving to a new supply thread). Any, or a mix, of these upgrading 
trajectories can create a degree of scarcity, and thus higher returns.    
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(Lipsey and Crystal, 1999).
8 Thus, barriers to entry help to explain the extent to which rents are 
distributed along a value chain.  
 
      Governance is the extent to which chain actors control, co-ordinate, manage and 
exert power over other actors within the supply thread. In essence, governance explains the 
insertion of certain producers and firms in particular portions of the supply thread. Lead firms 
often control the abilities of subordinate actors to upgrade their own activities, and co-ordinate 
and allocate roles to firms below them.
9 Early value chain analysis used a binary opposition 
between  arms-length  market  relations  (often  for  standard  products  which  are  not  highly 
specified) versus vertically integrated chains (for bespoke products that require high degrees of 
co-ordination) to describe governance regimes. From these two ends of the continuum, Gereffi 
et al (2005) suggest five basic types of value chain governance (see Figure 1): markets (where 
the costs of switching to new partners is low); modular value chains (where a supplier takes full 
responsibility for meeting the requirements of a customer, often through using generic capital 
goods); relational value chains (where close mutually-beneficial linkages between firms, based 
on location, kinship or ethnicity, contribute to inter-dependence and asset specificity); captive 
value  chains  (where  small  suppliers  are  dependent  on,  and  informally  controlled  by,  larger 
buyers); and hierarchical value chains (in other words, vertical integration where the lead firm 
controls all stages of the chain). 
 




      Source: Gereffi et al (2005) 
 
      Thus, governance is closely linked to the fourth component of value chain analysis 
analysis utilised here: systemic efficiency. As described above, due to the nature of production 
becoming ever more specialised, the realisation of surplus is becoming more dependent on 
increasing  efficiency  between  productive  processes,  not  within  them  (Kaplinsky  and  Morris, 
                                                 
8 Natural causes of largeness include economies of scale (where an increase in size decreases variable 
costs of production), a lack of competition due to the cost of capital goods to enter high-rent segments of 
the value chain, and third, economies of scope (where the smaller the firm, the greater the relative costs to 
enter key sales markets). Firm-created causes of largeness include mergers and acquisitions (in pursuit of 
economies of scale), aggressive pricing policies (where companies infringing on high-rent segments of a 
chain,  or  infringing  on  the  territory  of  a  cartel,  are  priced  out  of  a  market),  and  third,  straightforward 
aggression, intimidation and predation (where prospective entrants to a market are threatened or have 
their staff poached). 
9 There are five key parameters which are the subject of control in a value chain: what is to be produced, 
how it is going to be produced, when it is going to be produced, how much is going to be produced, and 
price (Humphrey and Schmidt 2001).  
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2000).  In other words, contemporary value chains are shifting from market forms of governance 
towards hierarchical and vertically co-ordinated forms of governance. For example, Catelo and 
Costales (2008) detail five types of vertical co-ordination within agricultural value chains which 
loosely map onto the five types of governance outlined above.  
 
      Figure 2 – Strategic options for vertical co-ordination 
 
 
      Source: Catelo and Costales (2008) 
 
      Before comparing the smallholder burley supply thread in the 2003/04 and 2009/10 
seasons across these four components, we offer an overview of the global burley market before 
describing the annual cycle of smallholder burley production in Malawi.  
 
      In  line  with  increased  global  production  in  recent  decades,  the  proportion  of 
tobacco traded has increased from around one fifth in the 1980s to around one third in the early 
2000s  (Kabambe,  2007).  However,  most  tobacco  is  still  manufactured  and  consumed 
domestically. For example, whilst China is now the world’s largest tobacco producer (mainly of 
flue cured) it mainly supplies domestic markets. Indeed, demand is such that China has moved 
from being a net exporter to a net importer in recent years (ibid). Most production in the United 
States (of both flue cured and burley) also meets domestic demand. In contrast, Brazil, another 
major producer which also grows both flue cured and burley, has rapidly increased exports from 
close  to  150,000  metric  tonnes  in  the  early  1980s  to  around  500,000  in  the  mid-2000s 
(Kabambe, 2007; Moyer-Lee, 2011).  
 
      Malawi  is  one  of  the  three  major  producers  and  exporters  of  burley  tobacco 
alongside  Brazil  and  the  United  States  (Jaffee,  2003;  Moyer-Lee,  2011).  Despite  strong 
international competition, demand for Malawian burley on international markets remains strong 
as it has a good reputation on world markets as a flavourless, clean ‘filler’ tobacco. Therefore, it 
does not compete directly with burley produced in the United States, Brazil or India (Jaffee 
2003). Moreover, whilst the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has focussed 
attention  on  the  dangers  of  tobacco  consumption,  world  demand  is  still  increasing  with 
developing  countries  now  accounting  for  a  greater  proportion  of  both  production  and 
consumption (Jaffee 2003). We now introduce the reader to the annual cycle of smallholder 
burley production in Malawi.   
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      The smallholder burley production cycle starts with the preparation of nursery beds 
in August or September long before the first rains arrive in November or December.
11  A small 
portion of dambo (wetland) is tilled and prepared, one metre wide and up to thirty metres long.
12 
Basal  fertiliser  is  applied  prior  to  sowing,  and  mulch  is  added  to  protect  the  germinating 
seedlings. 
 
Box 1 - Agricultural Research Extension Trust (ARET)  
 
Sources: ARET (2004), interviews in Lilongwe.  
 
      Nursery  beds  are  watered  three  times  daily  and  after  germination  mulch  is 
removed.  Insecticides  and  fungicides  are  often  used  at  this  stage  (dependent  on  capital 
constraints).
13  Later a top dressing of fertiliser is applied, and seedlings are hardened through 
clipping and reducing the frequency of watering. In the months before the rains, land is tilled 
using a hand-held hoe (kulima mizele).
14 When the first rains fall, seedlings, around 30cm tall, 
are transplanted into the ridges (kudzala fodya), preferably at 60cm intervals. Immediately after 
planting, basal fertiliser is applied (sourced from local traders or firms).
15   
 
Box 2 - Fertiliser companies 
 
Sources: Westlake, 1999; Kabambe, 2007 
 
                                                 
10 The following annual production cycle is of smallholder burley production in Kasungu district. It is based 
mainly on the 2003/04 season. In this example the smallholder is part of a burley ‘club’ and sells his/her 
bales on the auction floors in Lilongwe (see Negri and Porto, 2008). The description of the value chain 
includes the processing of burley in Malawi, and its export to Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
11 Smallholder agricultural production in Malawi is mainly based on the unimodal pattern of rainfall from 
November/December through to March/April. The production of tobacco requires basic tools such as a 
hoe, sickle, watering can, axe, and knife available from trading stores.  
12 Nursery beds are rotated annually to prevent the build up of nematodes.  
13 The insecticides and fungicides include Copper Oxychloride, Azaldrine, Seven-Seven, and Orthene.  
14 Burley ridges are slightly larger than maize ridges and are roughly one metre apart with a flat top. Box 
ridges hinder surface run-off.   
15 The recommended fertiliser for basal dressing is Super D or D Compund (Chapola 1994). Very few 
smallholders use these fertilisers and instead use the cheaper 23:21 fertiliser for maize. It is recommended 
that basal fertiliser be applied 10 cm away from the seedling and 10 cm deep. Top dressing should be 15 
cm from the stem of the plant and 15 cm deep (Chapola, 1994). 
ARET produces high-quality tobacco seed, and commands around 90% of the domestic 
market  in  Malawi.  Whilst  disease-resistant  varieties  are  distributed  widely,  it  is  still 
common for smallholders to recycle seed from high-yielding plants. ARET also has a 
number of further functions: first, offering agronomic advice to tobacco farmers (although 
this is limited for smallholder farmers); and, since 2006/07, completing the annual costs 
of  production  which,  along  with  other  estimates,  are  discussed  and  agreed  upon  by 
stakeholders at the annual tobacco seminar.  
In the 1990s the fertiliser market in Malawi was dominated by the parastatal Optichem, 
Norsk  Hydro,  Farmers  World/Agora,  Rab  Processors,  ADMARC  and  a  Smallholder 
Revolving Fund. The former two companies used to supply the estate sub sector before 
the  fertiliser  market  was  reformed  in  the  mid-1990s.  Farmers  World/Agora  and  Rab 
Processors  emerged  as  key  private  sector  actors  after  the  role  of  the  paraststals  – 
ADMARC and the Smallholder Revolving Fund – was scaled back. In the early 2000s, 
the  private  sector  sold  between  120,000  and  180,000  MT  of fertiliser  each  year  with 
public sector bodies selling between 20,000 and 40,000 MT. However, the proportion of 
fertiliser sold by ADMARC and the Smallholder Revolving Fund increased rapidly from 
the 2006/07 season due to the recent fertiliser subsidy programme.   
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      Many smallholders rely on credit to purchase fertiliser. High default rates on loans 
for smallholders have been an on-going issue in Malawi, often resulting in the dissolution and 
reformation of tobacco clubs (see Box 3).  
 
Box 3 - Smallholder credit institutions for tobacco production 
 
Sources: Jaffee (2003), Diagne and Zeller (2001). 
 
      Following  the  application  of  basal  fertiliser  land  is  weeded  (kupalila  fodya)  and 
usually a top dressing of fertiliser is applied two weeks after planting.
16  Ridges are then banked 
(to prevent weed growth). By January, the lower leaves of the burley plants (flyings) can be 
reaped (kuthyola fodya).
17 Yellowed leaves are sewn in bunches of four using dried grass and 
hung  on  wooden  poles  within  a  curing  shed  (chigaffa).
18    Flowers  are  removed  along  with 
suckers (to maximise leaf growth).  Cured leaves, which have turned from green/yellow to a 
reddish brown, are stored in an enclosed part of the shed. Some weeks later cured leaves are 
conditioned – kufewetsa  fodya – and are graded (kusankha fodya) according to size, colour 
and quality. Similar grades are tied into hands (kumanga  ndindi) . To make a bale of tobacco, 
hands of a similar grade are compressed into hessian sacking (which requires a tobacco press, 
two pieces of hessian, cotton twine and labels).  
 
 
3.1  Burley clubs 
 
      To market tobacco on the auction floors, smallholders register their club with the 
Tobacco Control Commission (see Box 4). A club, usually between 12-20 people, is allocated a 
registration number and a marketing quota. 
  
Box 4 - Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) 
                                                 
16 Most smallholders use the recommended top dressing of CAN, although Urea is used instead. 
17 Reaping tobacco takes place after the morning dew has evaporated but before the day is too hot.  
Leaves have to be sewn and hung in barns on the day of reaping.  
18  Ideally,  the shed  is  maintained  and  repaired in  the months  prior to  the onset  of  the  rains  (termite-
damaged timber is replaced, new plastic sheeting for the roof is obtained, and grass – udzu – is       used 
for thatching. The rate at which burley is cured can be controlled through altering the spacing between 
poles) on which, according to prevailing weather conditions.  
In the early 1990s smallholders received credit from the Smallholder Credit Association (SACA), 
mainly for hybrid maize production. In 1993, due mainly to the politicisation of the credit system 
associated with the arrival of democracy in 1994, SACA collapsed. This led to the creation of 
the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), created as an autonomous government-owned 
company in 1993/94, and given technical advice and finance from the World Bank. Although not 
designed as such, MRFC became the largest lender to smallholder burley clubs, so that by the 
late  1990s  most  of  the  company’s  loans  were  directed  to  what  was  termed  ‘mixed  crop’ 
production (in other words, burley). By the late 1990s repayment rates were high, over 90% in 
some years. At this time, smallholders could also receive credit from other financial institutions: 
including  the  Malawi  Union  of  Savings  and  Credit  Cooperatives  (MUSCCO),  Smallholder 
Agricultural Credit Cooperative (SACCO), as well as commercial lenders. Repayment rates for 
loans declined early in the last decade, not least due to the famine of 2001/2002. In recent 
years further financial institutions, such as Opportunity International, have entered this market.   
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Sources: Matthews et al. (1992), interview Managing Director TCC. 
 
      To  transport  tobacco  to  the  auction  floors,  clubs  are  affiliated  to  one  of  two 
marketing channels – the Ministry of Agriculture/Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) or a 
farmers’  organisation,  such  as  the  National  Smallholder  Farmers’  Association  of  Malawi 
(NASFAM).  These  differ  in  terms  of  extension  advice,  access  to  credit,  and  the  mode  of 
transportation.  
 
      Whilst the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has an extension office in each Extension 
Planning Area (EPA), smallholder clubs receive limited extension advice from officers. However, 
the MoA does facilitate access to credit institutions. MoA clubs market their tobacco via the 
TAMA satellite depot system. In this respect the system for MoA clubs mirrors arrangements for 
estate growers (see Box 5).  
 
Box 5 - Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA)  
 
Source: Matthews et al (1992), USAID (1991a).  
 
      Most  smallholders  prefer  to  register  with  a  farmers’  organisation,  the  largest  of 
which  is  NASFAM.  Individual  NASFAM  clubs  are  joined  together  into  local  Group  Action 
Committees (GACs), which together form district-level associations (see Box 6). These in turn 
are aggregated into a national body. NASFAM clubs receive extension advice from their local 
association, which also sells basic farm inputs and provides a marketing channel for alternative 
cash  crops  such  as  soya  and  groundnuts.  The  local  NASFAM  association  also  acts  as  an 
intermediary for lenders, and collectively negotiates transport rates for clubs from their local 
GAC storage sheds to the auction floors.
19  
 
Box 6 - National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (NASFAM) 
                                                 
19 NASFAM’s transport charges tend to be cheaper than TAMA’s as NASFAM head office invites tenders 
for each association, with shortlisted transporters interviewed by the local association before agreeing on a 
price.  Each association usually chooses a number of transporters to move their bales to the floors. 
TAMA  represented  estate  tobacco  growers  when  smallholders  were  excluded  from 
growing  burley  tobacco,  and  remains  an  influential  stakeholder  in  the  industry.  For 
example,  in  the  early  2000s  the  President  of  TAMA  was  also  the  President  of  the 
International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA), a global pro-tobacco lobbying group. 
TAMA operates a series of local-level depots from where tobacco is stored, and then 
transported to the auction floors. Smallholders are now able to use this service. TAMA 
tends  to  utilise  region-based  transporter  associations  such  as  the  Northern  Region 
Transporters Association, the Local Transport Association in the Central Region, and the 
Regional Transport Association in the South.  
 
The  Tobacco  Control  Commission  is  a  semi-autonomous  organ  of  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture and is charged with overseeing the smooth functioning of the tobacco industry. 
The TCC is responsible for tobacco crop estimates, marketing quotas, the arbitration of 
auction floor sales, defining classes and grades of tobacco, and the licensing of floors, 
buyers and graders. As the ‘referee’ in the industry, the TCC also withholds the proceeds 
from overproduction for a number of weeks.  The TCC board consists of key stakeholders 
from the tobacco industry, as well as political appointees. In 2009/10 the neutral image of 
the TCC had changed. Due to considerable changes in personnel the TCC was seen to 
be much closer to government than other stakeholders.    
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Source: Riley (1997) 
 
      Bales of burley to be sold on the auction floors are first taken to a NASFAM GAC 
or a TAMA depot, depending on the affiliation of the club (often using an ox-cart or matola). 
Within a few days or weeks the bale is transported on a truck to the auction floors, run by AHL 
(see Box 7).   
 
Box 7 - Auction Holdings Ltd (AHL) 
 
Sources: Matthews et al (1992), interview with Managing Director AHL, shareholding data from 
Company House, Blantyre. 
 
      On  the  Lilongwe  auction  floors,  bales  are  stored  outside  on  trucks  until  the 
consignment is accepted into storage.
20 Once the bale reaches the floors, it is auctioned and 
bought by a leaf merchant in US dollars. In 2003/04 there were three main buyers of burley on 
the auction floors – Limbe Leaf, Stancom and Dimon – and one minor buyer: Africa  Leaf (see 
Box 8). The auction floors and system is described in detail in Box 9.  
 
Box 8 - Leaf merchant companies in 2003/04 
 
Sources: Shareholding data from Company House, Blantyre; Matthews et al. (1992) 
 
Box 9 - The auction floor system in 2003/04 
                                                 
20 In the 2003/04 delays stretched from weeks into months 
In 2003/04 Limbe Leaf was the dominant tobacco leaf merchant in Malawi. It was owned 
by the largest global leaf merchant, Universal Leaf (58%), and Press Corporation (42%), 
the largest limited company in Malaw. Stancom and Dimon were the two further main 
buyers: wholly-owned subsidiaries of US leaf companies (the second and third largest 
global leaf merchants, respectively). The last buyer was Africa Leaf, which was created 
when a previous company, Intabex Dibrell, was bought by Dimon. Limbe Leaf, Stancom 
and Intabex Dibrell located in Malawi in the 1960s. Limbe Leaf became the dominant leaf 
merchant with the withdrawal of the Imperial Tobacco Company in the early 1980s. 
NASFAM emerged from USAID's involvement with the burley reform process/ Originally 
set up as the Smallholder Agricultural Development Project (SADP) in 1995, the project 
aimed  to  offer  independent  extension  advice  to  smallholder  clubs  and  allow  clubs  to 
receive credit.  SADP expanded rapidly and in 1997, with further USAID funding, became 
NASFAM.  Whilst  initially  focussing  on  burley  tobacco  production  and  marketing, 
NASFAM has more recently encouraged crop diversification through promoting coffee, 
chillies, rice, soya and cotton. 
Auction Holdings Ltd manages the auction floors in Malawi.  AHL was created in 1962 with 
the amalgamation of the Limbe and Lilongwe floors, previously run by separate companies. 
In  1995  a  third  auction  floor  opened  in  Mzuzu.  The  function  of  the  auction  floors  is  to 
facilitate the smooth sale of tobacco to international exporters, and the prompt payment of 
growers after appropriate deductions. The main shareholder of AHL is ADMARC with 47% 
of stock. The remaining shares are shared between minority interests. In recent years AHL 
has opened district-level markets in Central and Southern Regions.   
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Source: Tour of auction floors, participant observation.  
 
 
3.2  The tobacco factory and export 
 
      Once purchased by a leaf company, a bale is transported to an adjacent factory 
and  stored  according  to  grade.  In  due  course,  the  bale  is  processed  with  other  grades 
depending  on  the  requirements  of  buyer.    The  purpose  of  processing  burley  is  simple:  to 
remove the lamina from the stalk. Hands are placed on a conveyer belt, and are cut into tips, 
mid-rib and butts. Tips, which contain very little stalk, are added at the end of the process. Butts 
are discarded. The mid-rib is conditioned with water, passed through a threshing drum, and 
onto a fan which blows the lighter lamina up and away from the heavier stalk (which falls to the 
bottom and is discarded). The residual lamina and stalk is passed through further threshers and 
dryers  that  decrease  in  size.  Separated  lamina  finally  goes  through  two  dryers  (to  reduce 
moisture content to twelve percent) and the ‘cut rag’ is placed into cartons and compressed. 
Each finished carton weighs 180kgs and is stored until export. Cartons are loaded into 20 foot 
containers,  with  48  boxes  weighing  roughly  8,800  kgs  (including  packaging)  per  container. 
These are usually exported by road to Durban and Beira (and prior to 2003 also via rail to 
Nacala – see Figure 3). Figure 4 shows that between 1994 and 2003 the majority of Malawian 
burley tobacco was exported to cigarette manufacturers in the USA, Europe and Japan.  
 
      Figure 3 - Malawi burley tobacco exports by port 
The auction floor is the focal point of the main industrial area in Lilongwe known as Kanengo. 
The floors are squeezed between the main processing factories, with elevated conveyer belts 
stretching into the AHL complex. Up to 12,000 bales of tobacco can be sold each day on the 
floors. Tobacco money lubricates the economy during the crop marketing season, as evidenced 
by  the  bars,  restaurants  and  pool  halls  bordering  the  floors  patronised  by  workers  (whose 
employer  can  be  deduced  by  the  colour  of  their  shirt).  This  is  where  old  friends  meet,  the 
season is discussed, and deals are struck.  Inside the floors all the bales in a consignment with 
the  same  registration  number  are  lined  up  together.  Bales  are  moved  around  the  floors  by 
labourers  using  barrows.  Thirty  minutes  prior  to  the  start  of  the  sale  Tobacco  Control 
Commission  employees  grade  each  bale.  The  bales  are  opened  and  hands  of  tobacco  are 
displayed. On one side of the line of bales is the starter, the auctioneer and two ticket markers. 
All these actors work for Auction Holdings. On the opposite side of the bale are four leaf buyers. 
The first from Dimon, the second from Stancom, the third, who stands across the bale from the 
auctioneer, from Limbe Leaf. The last buyer was from Africa Leaf. The structure of the buying 
line-up reveals the power relations in the industry. The Dimon and Stancom buyers will have 
seen, touched, maybe smelt, the tobacco before bidding on it. The Limbe Leaf buyer has the 
tobacco in his hand at the point of purchase. The starter offers a price according to the grade 
and the auctioneers reduces then increases the price until all bids have been made. However, if 
the starter is not happy with the final bid, the bale can be ‘bought’ by the ‘house’ (AHL). The bale 
is then reoffered at a later date. With the exception of the starter, the bids are usually made 
using hand signals. The line-up is not stationary but constantly moves at walking pace down the 
lines of tobacco. Leaf company employees follow the sale to ensure their company buys their 
allocated percentage. These ‘checkers’ work in association with TCC arbitrators who confirm 
when  a  bale  containing  mixed  grades  or  non-tobacco-related  material  (NTRM)  is  found. 
Growers’ representatives also follow the sale, checking that the prices paid are acceptable. If 
the price paid is too low then they tear the sale ticket, and the bale is reoffered on a date some 
days or weeks later.   
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      In  2003/04  the  export  of  tobacco  was  monitored  by  the  Tobacco  Exporters 
Association of Malawi (TEAM), but information on how much tobacco was bought by particular 
manufacturers was very difficult to access (see Box 10).  However, informants suggested that 
Philip Morris, British American Tobacco and Japan Tobacco International were major buyers. 
Figure 5 offers a simplified illustration of the institutional framework.   
 
Box 10 - Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi (TEAM) 
 
Source: Matthews et al. (1992); interview with Managing Director, TCC. 
TEAM was established in 1930 to oversee all matters regarding the export of tobacco. 
Recently this has included liaising with the Reserve Bank of Malawi, the Malawi Revenue 
Authority, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The members of TEAM are the 
leaf companies and a few estate owners. TEAM vigorously opposed the introduction of 
smallholder  burley  production  in  the  1990s  citing  smallholders’  lack  of  expertise  in 
producing quality burley.  This concern with the quality of burley is still prescient, as seen 
by TEAM’s campaign  against non-tobacco-related-material (NTRM). TEAM represents 
the main leaf merchants’ interests in policy meetings, but by the 2009/10 season the 
importance of TEAM in the sector had diminished considerably.   
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      Figure 5 – Institutional framework in 2003/04 
 
 




























Dimon, Africa Leaf    
BAT, Philip Morris, JIT
 
 
      Source: Author’s illustration 
 
This  introduction  to  the  main  actors  within  the  supply  thread  allows  us  to  compare  the 
institutional framework, rents, governance and systemic efficiency in the 2003/04 and 2009/10 
seasons.    
20 – IOB Working Paper / 2011.09  Value Chain Analysis of Burley Tobacco in Malawi 
 
4.  BURLEY TOBACCO SUPPLY THREAD 2003/04 
 
      Kabambe  (2007)  outlines  how  most  countries  impose  border  tariffs  on  tobacco 
imports, with the average level of tariff around 38%. Certain countries impose very high tariffs, 
including  the  US  (68%),  one  of  Malawi’s  main  competitors  (ibid.).  However,  as  a  Least 
Developed Country, in 2003/04 Malawi enjoyed duty-free access to US markets through the 
Agricultural Growth and Opportunity (AGOA) Act of 2000 (US Government, 2000). Whilst burley 
and flue imports were not included in the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programme 
(see US Government, 1999), AGOA included both processed and unprocessed burley under 
product lines 2401.1061/63 and 2401.203133. Unfortunately, the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of 
the  US  Government  (2004)  highlights  how  Malawian  burley  imports  destined  for  cigarette 
manufacture were subject to a 12,000MT quota per annum. Kabambe (2007) also outlines how 
the US offers price support to domestic growers (other countries, such as China and India, also 
support production through subsidised inputs).   
 
      The trade regime in the EU at this time was slightly more progressive. In 2004 
Malawi enjoyed preferential access to EU markets for burley tobacco under the ACP Cotonou 
agreement  and  Everything  But  Arms  Initiative.  For  example,  in  2002  the  EU  (27)  imported 
almost  €89  million  of  burley,  which  equated  to  around  20%  market  share  with  no  tariffs 
(Eurostat, 2011; Stevens, 2004).
21 In 2003 and 2004 the value of burley imports into the EU 
appears to have dropped to around €59 million and €37 million, respectively (apparently driven 
by reduced demand from Germany). In contrast to the US, during this period the EU moved to 
curtail price support offered to tobacco growers within the EU (ibid.).
22   
 
      At the national level, and as described above, the main actors in 2003/04 were 
regulated  by  the  TCC  which  acted  as  a  referee  and  ombudsman.  Such  a  role  was  not 
straightforward.  The  TCC  had  to  balance  numerous  competing  interests,  including  political 
influences.  For  example,  although  the  TCC  was  answerable  to  the  Minister  of  Agriculture, 
during the UDF era (from 1994 through to 2004) government policy regarding tobacco often 
came from presidential directives. Moreover, key political appointees sat on the TCC board and 
the  directors  of  key  tobacco  institutions  were  seen  to  be  close  to  the  UDF  hierarchy.  For 
example, members of the UDF political elite at this time were seen to be very close to Limbe 
Leaf (through their interests in Press Corporation which jointly owns this merchant along with 
Universal  Leaf).
23    On  the  other  hand,  as  the  organ  representing  estate  owners  – TAMA  – 
appeared to have closer links to the Malawi Congress Party.  
 
      In 2003/04 the sector  was also subject to four standards and credence issues: 
methyl bromide; child labour; non tobacco-related materials (NTRM); and, most importantly, the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).  Methyl Bromide was once widely used on 
burley tobacco nurseries  as a pesticide (to reduce  nematodes). However, its  use has  been 
restricted by the United Nations’ Montreal Protocol to limit ozone-depleting gases, and has been 
phased out in Malawi.
24  
 
      Second, since the late 1990s cigarette manufacturers have become increasingly 
concerned with child labour. In 2000 manufacturers and growers’ organisations created a global 
NGO  –  Eliminating  Child  Labour  in  Tobacco  (ECLT)  –  as  part  of  their  corporate  social 
                                                 
21 Stevens (2004) also notes how the bilateral EU–South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement  eroded  the  relative  competitiveness  of  Malawian  companies  compared  to  South  African 
tobacco exporters. 
22 Through changing production-linked payments to a single-farm payment scheme.  
23 The UDF elite at this time also had particular investments in transportation and trading, including within 
the tobacco sector. 
24 Instead, farmers are encouraged to use alternative pesticides, use floating seed trays, and rotate their 
nurseries more frequently.  
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responsibility strategy.
25  In Malawi, leaf companies along with BAT financed the creation of an 
NGO – Together Ensuring Children’s Security (TECS) – which campaigned against child labour.  
 
      The  third  credence  factor  was  non-tobacco-related  materials  (NTRM).  Leaf 
merchants  became  concerned  with  smallholders  tying  leaves  and  hands  of  tobacco  with 
polypropylene  strips  (from  fertiliser  bags)  because  manufacturers  feared  litigation.
  26    The 
seriousness of this issue was illustrated in the 2004 season when Philip Morris cancelled some 
orders of Malawian burley due to NTRM.
27  
 
      The  last  element  of  the  global  institutional  framework  discussed  here  is  the 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC).
28 Due to concerns over public health, this 
treaty  has  attempted  to  limit  tobacco  consumption  and  production.  Clearly,  as  Malawi  is 
dependent on tobacco, any limits on production could have serious implications. We now turn to 
smallholder rents in 2003/04.  
 
 
4.1   Smallholder rents in 2003/04 
 
      The costs of production and marketing for a smallholder credit recipient in Kasungu 
district for the 2003/2004 season are summarised in Table 1 (details are in Annex 1). These 
figures follow the annual cycle of tobacco production outlined above, and are for an intensive 
model of smallholder production (without imputing the cost of household labour). This model 
shows what better-off smallholder growers in Kasungu district were receiving.
 29    
 
Table 1 - Summary of costs of production and marketing using credit 
 
Kwacha  Kwacha per kg  Cents per kg 
1.  PRODUCTION COSTS 
Total nursery and land cost  12144.17  24.29  22.49 
Total loan costs  3412.35  6.82  6.32 
Total chigaffa costs  5670  11.34  10.50 
Total Production Costs  21226.52  42.45  39.31 
2. MARKETING COSTS 
Total marketing preparation costs  5920  11.84  10.96 
Total deductions on floors  3118.5  6.24  5.78 
Total other costs  945.25  1.89  1.75 
Total Marketing Costs  9983.75  19.97  18.49 
TOTAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING COSTS  31210.27  62.42  57.80 
GROSS PROCEEDS    59400  118.80  110.00 
BASED ON   500kg  /  1 acre  / 5 bales / $ 1.10 per Kg  
NET RETURN TO FARMER 
  28189.73  56.38  52.20   
                                                 
25 See http://www.eclt.org/index.html. Accessed 16/5/05 
26 Some fertiliser bags in Malawi are made from thin woven plastic strips which unravel easily.  
27 This led to the Lilongwe auction floors operating at 50 per cent capacity for some of the season. 
28 See http://www.fctc.org/about_FCTC/, http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/ . Accessed: 16/05/05 
29 Overall, the intensive model of production employed in the costs of production assumes a smallholder 
yield of 500kgs per acre. This is an optimistic assumption. For example, the average smallholder burley 
yield  in  Kasungu  Agricultural  Development  District  (ADD)    in  2001  was  280.4  per  acre  (701 per  hec) 
(Mwasikakata 2003), whilst a small-n survey in Kasungu district in 2004 found an average burley yield of 
360kgs per acre.   
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Source: Author’s estimates, see Annex 1 for full details 
 
      The costs of production for this intensive model (with credit) suggests a net margin 
of only 52.2 cents per kg. Thus, a smallholder using credit and marketing 500kgs on the auction 
floors would receive a net profit of around US$261.02.
30   
 
4.1.1  Marketing channels  
 
      In  2003/04  smallholders  in  Kasungu  had  three  marketing  channels  for  burley. 
Whilst the auction floors were the most popular channel, smallholders also utilised intermediate 
buyers (IBs) and a cross-border trade in burley tobacco. IBs were introduced in the 1993/1994 
season and were most active in 1997 when they brought 20,000 tons – around fifteen percent of 
the national burley crop – to the auction floors (Jaffee 2003, Van Donge 2002b).  Since then, IB 
activity was restricted and was banned from the 2001/2002 season. But this does not mean that 
the  practice  ended:  instead,  IBs  marketed  tobacco  through  their  own  or  an  associate’s 
registration number.  The cross-border trade in the first years of the past decade is hard to 
quantify.
31  Jaffee  (2003)  suggests  that  in  2001  at  least  10,000  tons  of  Malawian-produced 
burley  was taken into adjacent countries for sale, representing eight percent  of the national 
burley crop. Other figures suggest that the amount taken outside was much greater than this 
(see TEAM, 2002).  
 
      The choice of marketing channel has a large influence on profitability.  Appendix 2 
compares the net margins of smallholder burley production in 2003/04 when marketed through 
each of these channels (with auction floor sales using NASFAM transportation).  The table uses 
the same intensive model of smallholder burley production as Annex 1, but without the use of 
credit (to avoid non-repayment of loans skewing the comparison). Annex 2 shows that a non-
credit grower in 2003/04 could receive a net return of 59 cents per kg from the auction floors. 
Selling burley across the border in Zambia yielded a net margin of 41 cents per kg. However, 
marketing burley through an IB yielded only 2 cents per kg. This highlights three functions of IBs 
in the rural economy: first, they are used as an instant source of liquidity at the start of the 
marketing season (with smallholders subsequently using another channel); second, they are a 
key  channel  for  small-scale  low-intensity  producers  (who  do  not  bale  tobacco  but  sell  it  in 
hands); and third, they are a  channel for low-quality leaf, such as flyings.
32 
 
      The considerable difference between the profitability of the auction floors and the 
CBT (around 18 cents per kg) poses the question: why did smallholders send bales to Zambia 
in light of the risks involved? Part of popularity of the CBT in 2003/04 was due to clubs avoiding 
loan repayments (which are automatically deducted by Auction Holdings from growers’ gross 
proceeds).  A  further  factor  was  liquidity.  Buying  stations  in  Zambia  pay  within  3-4  days.  In 
2003/04, payment from the auction floors took at least 3-4 weeks, if not months.  
 
 
4.1.2   Levies accrued by tobacco-related institutions 
 
Higher  profit  margins,  the  institutional  structure  of  the  industry,  and  path  dependence  have 
ensured that most burley tobacco is still sold on the auction floors. When a bale of tobacco is 
purchased numerous deductions are made on behalf of tobacco-related institutions. These are 
shown in Table 2 for the 2003/04 season.  
                                                 
30 Analysis by Keyser and Lungu (1997) in the mid-1990s suggests that the only other crops in Malawi that 
approach this level of profitability were tomatoes and paprika  
31 A report by Nakhumwa and Minde (1996) on informal cross-border trade fails to mention tobacco once, 
indicating how this practice emerged in the late 1990s.  
32 Many smallholders use multiple marketing channels each season. For example, first selling to an IB to 
receive access money, and subsequently sending the majority of bales to the auction floors.   
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Table 2 - Levies and deductions on the auction floors in 2004 
 
 
TCC levy  
 
 
0.10 cents per kg 
AHL levy  
 
3.25 percent of total proceeds 
Hessian levy 
 
30 cents per bale (TAMA) 
ARET levy 
 
1 percent of total proceeds 
TAMA/NASFAM levy  
 
0.70 cents per kg applicable to institution members  
Classification levy  
 
Undertaken by TCC at no additional cost 
Witholding Tax of 7 percent  
 
Not applied to smallholders earning less than MK36,000.   
 
Transport   Variable  -  From  Kasungu  to  Lilongwe  in  2003/04  season) 
TAMA charged 707kw per bale, and NASFAM 440 kw per bale 
 
 
Sources: Government of Malawi 2004, interviews 
 
In  2003/04,  these  amounted  to  6.48  cents  per  kg,  which  represents  12.4  percent  of 
smallholders’ net return. The extent to which these deductions are appropriate to the services 
rendered has been a matter of some contention. The structure of the industry, including the 
auction  system,  is  often  depicted  as  being  over-regulated  and  inefficient  (see  World  Bank 
2004a, 2006). Whilst deductions by tobacco institutions were certainly excessive in the past 
(see SADP 1997, SADP 1999), the levies in 2003/04 appear less onerous on producers (see 
World Bank, 2004b).  
 
 
4.1.3   Processing and export of tobacco in 2003/04 
 
As we’ve seen, once a bale of burley is purchased, it is stored, processed and exported to 
global cigarette manufacturers. Table 3 shows the costs of processing and exporting burley, up 
to an estimated landed price of US $5 per kg, paid by a cigarette manufacturer at Rotterdam in 
2004.  As  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  get  price  information  from  tobacco  leaf  companies,  the 
estimate of US $5 is an average of figures suggested by informants in the ‘trade’. 
 
Table 3 - Costs of processing and export per kg 
 
PROCESSING COSTS    
    
Auction Floor Price   110 
    
Buyer Overhead Costs   11 
Short-term Storage Costs   2 
Threshing Costs   15 
Yield (70%)   41.33 
Re-drying and Packaging   25 
Materials   11 
Interest (3 months at 8.5% p.a.)   4.57 
Total Processing Costs  109.9 
   
PURCHASE AND PROCESSING COSTS   219.9  
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SHIPPING COSTS    
    
Transport to Durban and Port Charges   15 
Insurance   3.66 
Ocean Freight to Europe   18 
Total Shipping Costs  36.66 
    
TOTAL PURCHASE, PROCESSING AND SHIPPING COSTS   256.56 
    
MANUFACTURERS PAYMENT FOR LANDED BURLEY  500 
    
LEAF MERCHANT PROFIT  243.44 
 
Source:  Based on Jaffee 2003, interviews 
 
Table 3 shows that at an assumed sale price of US $5 the leaf merchants’ net margin is around 
243 cents per kg. The considerable profits to be made from processing tobacco explain why the 
leaf merchant companies aggressively protected their segment of the supply thread.  
 
 
4.2   Governance in 2003/04 
 
      The global tobacco value chain is driven by global cigarette manufacturers such as 
British  American  Tobacco  (BAT),  Philip  Morris  and  JIT.  At  the  start  of  each  season  these 
manufacturers jointly instruct leaf companies in Malawi the ‘trade’ requirements. For the 2004 
season these were 135-140 million kgs of burley, 15-20 million kgs of flue-cured tobacco, and 5-
7 million kgs of fire-cured tobacco (TCC 2004). The governance of the global tobacco value 
chain by manufacturers has led to ‘obligatory contractual relations’ where the security of supply, 
and the familiarity of suppliers, is deemed more important than an evaluation purely on price 
terms (and thus reflects a relational governance regime, as illustrated in Figure 1).  
 
      Within Malawi, the supply thread (i.e. minus the activities of the lead firms – the 
cigarette manufacturers) is itself buyer driven, by the leaf merchant companies.  In 2003/04 
Limbe Leaf was the dominant tobacco leaf merchant in Malawi, and was the leading actor in a 
cartel  that  allegedly  depressed  prices  and  protected  high-rent  segments  of  the  thread. 
Interestingly, the allegation that lead companies operated as a cartel on the auction floors (Van 
Donge  2002;  Jaffee  2003;  Hayward  2004;  Stanbrook  2005a,  2005b)  is  confirmed  by  key 
informant interviews and Auction Holdings sales figures for 2004.
33 Informants claimed that the 
burley market in 2004 was carved up on a daily basis with Limbe Leaf (LL) buying 46 percent of 
the crop and the other two main leaf companies  - Stancom (S) and Dimon (D) – buying 23 
percent. The smallest company, Africa Leaf, was said to purchase eight percent. Moreover, 
informants  suggested  that  leaf  companies  frequently  ‘shared  out’  bales  in  a  pre-determined 
buying sequence: LL, S, D, LL, LL, S, D, AF, LL, S, D, LL, LL, S, D, AF. 
 
      The claim that buyers purchased bales in a predetermined sequence is supported 
by  data  from  Auction  Holdings.  The  data,  from  June  2004,  was  provided  by  the  General 
Manager  and  was  randomly  selected  from  Auction  Holdings  records.  It  only  contained 
information on the purchase of 781 bales. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the number of 
bales bought by each company. 
 
Table 4 – Bales bought by different leaf companies and the ‘house’ 
                                                 
33  The  alleged  collusion  and  operation  of  a  cartel  in  the  tobacco  market  in  Malawi  in  2003/04  is 
symptomatic of the structure of the global tobacco market. Leaf merchant companies were fined by the 
European Commission in 2006 for collusion in both Spain and Italy.  
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Company  Number of bales  %  Average price  Std. Dev.  
         
Limbe Leaf  305  39.1  118.17  17.60 
Stancom  170  21.8  121.36  20.21 
Dimon  160  20.5  120.01  18.80 
Africa  67  8.6  120.82  22.73 
Auction Holdings   79  10.1  135.26  16.41 
         
Total  781  100.0  121.18  19.38 
         
Source: Author’s estimates from Auction Holdings’ data 
 
      Table  4  shows  the  proportion  of  bales  bought  by  each  company  corresponds 
broadly to the breakdown of purchases described above (if one reapportions the 10% of bales 
‘bought’ by the house and sold to the four companies at a later date). 
34 Once the Auction 
Holdings bales are removed from a comparison, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the mean prices paid by the four companies. 
35 
 
      Importantly,  however,  the  data  allows  us  to  investigate  the  order  in  which 
companies purchased tobacco. The buying sequence above suggests that three companies 
tended to purchase a bale of burley immediately after another company: Stancom tended to buy 
bales after Limbe Leaf; Dimon tended to buy bales after Stancom; and Africa Leaf tended to 
purchase  bales  after  Dimon.  We  can  test  these  propositions  by  using  three  simple  logistic 
regression models. The dependent variable in each model was a dummy representing the bales 
the  leaf  company  in  question  (namely,  Stancom,  Dimon  and  Africa  Leaf)  purchased.  The 
independent variables in each model are shown in Table 5. The models for Stancom, Dimon 
and Africa Leaf were run in five blocks with each of the variables in Table 5 in a single block 
(ordered as above). The results from the full logit models are shown in Tables 6 to 8 which 
show a degree of similarity to the buying pattern suggested by informants. 
 
Table 5 – Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev. 
       
PRICE  Price at which bale was purchased for 
121.1769  19.38495 
P1LL_dummy  Whether Limbe Leaf bought the previous bale  
.3905  .48818 
P1Stancom_dummy 
Whether Stancom bought the previous bale 
.2177  .41293 
P1Dimon_dummy 
Whether Dimon bought the previous bale 
.2049  .40386 
P1Africa_dummy 
Whether Africa Leaf  bought the previous bale 
.0858  .28023 
       
 
Source: Author’s estimates from Auction Holdings’ data 
 
 
Table 6 – Coefficients from Stancom  model 
 
    B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
Step 1  price  .004  .005  .801  1  .371  1.004 
P1LL_dummy  1.112  .338  10.822  1  .001  3.040 
P1Stancom_dummy  -.339  .397  .728  1  .394  .713 
P1Dimon_dummy  .001  .384  .000  1  .999  1.001 
P1Africa_dummy  -.006  .465  .000  1  .989  .994 
                                                 
34 The higher prices ‘paid’ by Auction Holdings simply reflects the reserve price. 
35 An analysis of variance produces an F-ratio of 1.173 and a significance figure of 0.319.   
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    B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
Step 1  price  .004  .005  .801  1  .371  1.004 
P1LL_dummy  1.112  .338  10.822  1  .001  3.040 
P1Stancom_dummy  -.339  .397  .728  1  .394  .713 
P1Dimon_dummy  .001  .384  .000  1  .999  1.001 
P1Africa_dummy  -.006  .465  .000  1  .989  .994 
Constant  -2.247  .670  11.257  1  .001  .106 
 
-2 Log likelihood    = 769.20 
Model chi-squared  = 48.71 
Degrees of freedom  = 5   
Model significance  = 0.000 
Cox & Snell R Square  = 0.061 
Nagelkerke R Square  = 0.093 
 
Source: Author’s estimates from Auction Holdings’ data 
 
 
Table 7 – Coefficients from Dimon model 
 
    B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
Step 1  price  -.004  .005  .820  1  .365  .996 
P1LL_dummy  .149  .339  .194  1  .660  1.161 
P1Stancom_dummy  .899  .345  6.796  1  .009  2.458 
P1Dimon_dummy  -.078  .374  .043  1  .835  .925 
P1Africa_dummy  -.390  .484  .649  1  .421  .677 
Constant  -1.088  .664  2.681  1  .102  .337 
 
-2 Log likelihood   = 769.32 
Model Chi-squared  = 22.28   
Degrees of freedom  = 5 
Model significance  = 0.000 
Cox & Snell R Square   = 0.028 
Nagelkerke R Square   = 0.044 
 
Source: Author’s estimates from Auction Holdings’ data 
 
 
Table 8 – Coefficients from Africa leaf  model 
 
    B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
Step 1  price  .000  .007  .004  1  .949  1.000 
P1LL_dummy  .600  .553  1.175  1  .278  1.822 
P1Stancom_dummy  .157  .608  .067  1  .796  1.170 
P1Dimon_dummy  1.040  .565  3.391  1  .066  2.828 
P1Africa_dummy  .412  .693  .353  1  .552  1.510 
Constant  -2.877  .988  8.479  1  .004  .056 
 
-2 Log likelihood  = 449.96 
Model  = 7.026   
Degrees of freedom  = 5   
Model significance  = .219 
Cox & Snell R Square  = 0.009 
Nagelkerke R Square  = 0.020 
 
Source: Author’s estimates from Auction Holdings’ data 
 
      For  example,  Table  6,  which  assesses  whether  there  is  a  pattern  to  Stancom 
purchases on the auction floors, shows only one variable is statistically significant: the dummy  
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variable  which  represents  if  Limbe  Leaf  bought  the  previous  bale  (at  the  99%  level).  The 
strength of this relationship, that Stancom tended to buy bales immediately after Limbe Leaf, 
accounts for practically all the predictive power of the model (which is significant at the 99.9% 
level). The odds ratios show that with all else constant, Limbe Leaf buying the previous bale 
makes Stancom more than three times more likely to purchase a bale.
 36  
 
      Table  7,  which  assesses  Dimon  purchases,  again  shows  only  one  statistically 
significant variable. But this time it’s not Limbe Leaf buying the previous bale that is significant, 
but just as informants suggested, it’s Stancom (at the 99% level). Again, the strength of this 
relationship accounts for almost all of the predictive power of the model (significant at the 99% 
level). In this model the odds ratios show us that with all else held constant, Stancom buying the 
previous bale makes Dimon two and a half times more likely to purchase a bale.
 37    
 
      Table 8, which assesses Africa Leaf purchases, once again shows results which 
concur with claims of a buying sequence. In this variable, only one variable significant at the 
90% level: the Dimon dummy. However, the strength of this relationship was not sufficient to 
contribute to a statistically significant model (shown by model significance of 0.219). Thus, the 
first two logit models provide some statistical evidence to support claims that the leaf buyers 
operated a buying sequence on the auction floors in the 2004 season.  
 
      Informants also claimed that in 2003/04 Limbe Leaf set price bands to ensure price 
stability, and ensured compliance through pricing other companies out of the market if bands 
were broken. It was also claimed that the cartel stymied the emergence of new firms in the 
industry. Leaf companies’ control over the capital goods for processing tobacco limited new 
entrants into the sector and attempts other stakeholders in the sector to gain experience in 
exporting tobacco were consistently blocked (see Box 11).  
 
Box 11- Liberalising the export of tobacco 
 
Source: Interviews  
 
      Whilst there is a good evidence that a buying cartel did operate in 2003/04, the 
operation  of  this  cartel  needs  to  be  put  in  context:  the  leaf  companies  also  maintained  an 
‘obligation’ to growers as they guaranteed to purchase the entire tobacco crop. The strength of 
these ‘obligations’ were much greater prior to the liberalisation of burley, as leaf companies 
                                                 
36 Wald statistic 10.822, Sig. 0.001, Exp (B) 3.04.  
37 Wald statistic 6.796, Sig. 0.009, Exp (B) 2.46.  
In 2002 the Government of Malawi issued a directive to liberalise the export of tobacco. 
This was welcomed by the IMF, and the Tobacco Control Commission investigated how 
the modalities of export liberalisation would function in light of the need to ensure the 
integrity of exports, and to ensure the repatriation of foreign exchange earnings.  The 
tobacco  leaf  companies  were  less  enthusiastic  about  the  policy  development.  At  the 
annual tobacco seminar in 2002, the discussion of export liberalisation led the CEO of 
Limbe Leaf to demand that all the leaf company employees boycott the session, which 
they duly did. To push the reform agenda along, the World Bank funded a consultancy on 
the issue. However, the study never took place. The $40,000 which had been released to 
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  disappeared.  The  Ministry  of  Agriculture  still  proceeded  to 
submit proposed regulations to the World Bank. These were agreed in principle, and with 
the modalities in place, a pilot phase of export liberalisation was announced to the 2003 
tobacco seminar. The reaction of the leaf companies was immediate. The CEO of Limbe 
Leaf threatened that such a move could lead to a withdrawal of their capital investments 
from Malawi, and a possible shift to neighbouring countries. Such a threat was not idle as 
Limbe  Leaf  had  invested  in  a  new  large-scale  tobacco  processing  facility  in  Tete, 
Mozambique.    
28 – IOB Working Paper / 2011.09  Value Chain Analysis of Burley Tobacco in Malawi 
 
agreed to buy all types of burley within  a clear price band of between US$1 and US$1.50 a kg 
(Van Donge, 2002). In 2003/04, this price band did not hold, and low-quality burley received 




4.3  Systemic efficiency in 2003/04 
 
      Systemic efficiency leads to much greater governance of the value chain by lead 
firms. In our case here it mainly involves vertical integration through contract farming. The last 
two decades has seen a significant increase in contract farming by leaf merchant companies – 
such as Universal Leaf – and also by cigarette manufacturers, such as BAT, across Southern 
and Eastern Africa. However, contract farming has only emerged relatively recently in Malawi.  
 
      Large-scale contract farming of tobacco (defined here as when a firm lends inputs, 
such as seed, fertiliser, credit, and extension, to a farmer in exchange for exclusive purchasing 
rights over the resultant crop) started in Malawi in the 2001/02 season when Stancom arranged 
a  credit  facility  of  US  $3million  through  Citibank  to  provide  finance  for  inputs  on  Press 
Agriculture Estates.
39 By the 2002/03 season Limbe Leaf had asserted their dominance.  They 
displaced Stancom and signed a five-year deal with Press Agriculture to produce flue-cured on 
65 estates to substitute for the loss of flue-cured production in Zimbabwe. Importantly, Limbe 
Leaf received special dispensation from President Muluzi to bypass the auction floors and take 
the flue-cured leaf straight from Press Agriculture estates to their processing factories.  
 
      Soon  most  large-scale  estates  in  the  country,  both  ‘public’  and  private,  were 
contracted  by  leaf  merchants,  and  all  firms  were  allowed  to  take  ‘their’  tobacco  straight  to 
processing factories. Due to concerns that the leaf companies were under-declaring tobacco 
production  to  avoid  liabilities,  this  practice  was  prohibited  from  the  2003/04  season  and 
‘financed’ tobacco was marketed through a ‘silent auction’ system on the floors.
40 In the ‘silent 
auction’ system, prices for contracted tobacco are fixed by a neutral party according to pre-
determined grades (TCC 2004). 
 
      The leaf merchants also started contracting smallholders. The precedent here is 
Limbe  Leaf’s  purchase  of  Kasungu  Flue-cured  Tobacco  Authority  (KFCTA)  in  2000.  From 
2001/02 Limbe Leaf contracted 900 smallholder farmers on KFCTA land in Kasungu district to 
produce flue-cured tobacco (land which has now reverted to communal status – see Matemba 
and Charman, 2002). Since the 2002/03 season Dimon started contracting 2,500 smallholders 
in  Kasungu,  Lilongwe,  south  Mzimba  and  Rumphi.  Such  contracted  tobacco  also  passed 
through  the  ‘silent  auction’  system.  We  now  shift  forward  six  years  assess  the  institutional 
framework, rents, governance and systemic efficiency in the 2009/10 season.  
 
 
                                                 
38 The prevalence of ‘obligation contractual relations’ in the tobacco value chain and the burley tobacco 
supply thread distinguishes them from some  agricultural buyer-driven value chains which rely on arms-
length market relations to exert power over suppliers (see Dolan et al 1999, Barrientos et al 2003).  
39 Press Agriculture was at the centre of the large-scale estate expansion of tobacco hectarage in the 
1970s.  Through  the  late  1990s  Press  Agriculture  became  less  profitable  until  2000  when  tobacco 
production on the hundred or more estates faltered (Lynx Associates 2002, O&M Associates 2001). 
40 For example, the WTO (2010) highlights how export surrender requirements of 40% of foreign exchange 
receipts are in place for tobacco exports.  Moreover, tobacco exports have been subject to direct taxation 
by government in recent years.   
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5.   BURLEY TOBACCO SUPPLY THREAD 2009/10 
 
      Overall, tobacco’s share of total exports in Malawi increased from 49% to 67% by 
value from 2004 to 2008 (due to both higher prices and production) (WTO, 2010). WTO figures 
for total agricultural exports suggest that increased imports by the EU accounts for some of this 
increase. The data from the TCC on exports in 2009 supports this interpretation, and shows that 
Belgium was the main export destination (with almost 32,000 MT, followed by the Russia and 
the US with just under 10,000 MT each).  
 
      However, there are indications that Malawi is exporting less processed tobacco 
leaf. For example, figures from Eurostat (2011) suggest that imports of stripped burley leaf into 
the EU declined from 38 million in 2004 to just over 10 million in 2008. These figures suggest 
that a much greater proportion of Malawian burley has been imported unprocessed in recent 
years. Moreover, the WTO (2010) also highlights how 73% of total Malawian tobacco exports 
(by value) in 2008 was unprocessed. Naturally, exporting unprocessed leaf leaves much less 
value in Malawi. As these figures do not correspond with the breakdown burley exports in the 
2009 season reported by the TCC, which shows that 86% of exports (by weight) were stripped 
burley leaf and 14% was unprocessed (scraps, stems and leaves), this issue clearly requires 
further investigation.   Just as in 2003/04, whilst Malawi qualified for duty-free access to the 
United States under AGOA in 2009/10, the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the US Government 
(2010) highlights how burley destined for cigarette manufacture was still subject to a 12,000MT 
quota  per  annum.  It  is  also  possible  that  American  burley  producers  still  rely  on  direct 
government price support.  
 
      In  addition  to  trade  issues,  the  major  changes  to  the  institutional  framework 
concerned the four credence factors. First, in 2009/10 the ILO was still lobbying hard on child 
labour issues. For example, the ILO initiative Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco was active in 
Malawi with Philip Morris working with this initiative.  Second, non tobacco-related materials 
(NTRM), such as the inclusion of plastic in tobacco, was still causing manufacturers concerns. 
Moreover, a piece of legislation in Canada – the CC32 bill – was posing a threat to the burley 
industry.  This  bill  aims  to  ban  all  chemical  additives  in  tobaccos  and  is  aimed  mainly  at 
flavourings.    However,  it  also  affects  burley  as  this  type  of  tobacco  is  treated  by  chemical 
additives  during  manufacturing.  Third,  whilst  Malawi  is  not  a  signatory  to  the  Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, there are now voices within government that argue that the 
country  should  sign  and  lobby  within  the  Convention.  Lastly,  green  tobacco  sickness  has 
become an important issue. Whilst this condition is not so prevalent in Malawi compared to 
Brazil (which has higher humidity levels and thus a greater propensity for nicotine absorption 
through the skin), a campaign by Plan International has raised the profile of this issue in Malawi  
 
      The national level institutional framework has also changed considerably in the six 
year period. The first major change has been the introduction of district markets. In 2009/10 
there were two district markets, one in Kasungu district at Chinkhoma and one in the Southern 
Region  at  Ngodi. The  second  major  change  has  been  the  introduction  of  minimum  prices.  
Based on costs of production created by ARET, since the 2007/08 season government has set 
minimum prices each season for the 86 grades of burley.  Buyers are now required to sign a 
contract  with  government  each  season  with  the  minimum  prices  enforced  by  the  TCC.    
Government claims the process is transparent with minimum prices set at the annual tobacco 
seminar. The aim of the policy is to increase producer prices and prevent price disputes halting 
sales on the auction floors. Government intends smallholders to realise a 30% net margin on 
tobacco production.  
 
      However, in 2008 and 2009 the leaf companies did not meet the terms of their 
contract.  For  example,  the  average  target  price  in  2009  was  $2.03,  but  the  leaf  merchant 
companies only paid an average of $1.60.  The result was that senior managers of the leaf  
30 – IOB Working Paper / 2011.09  Value Chain Analysis of Burley Tobacco in Malawi 
 
companies had their work permits revoked. For example, in 2009 the CEOs of the main leaf 
companies  were  deported.    In  addition,  President  Mutharika  named  individuals  within  the 
industry who were ‘exploiting’ the country (including figures in the TCC who were seen to be too 
close to the leaf companies). Some statements had strong racial connotations (as company 
managers are often white South Africans, Zimbabweans or Malawians). Further changes to the 
institutional framework included new producer organisations and credit providers, and that the 
provision of hessian has been liberalised (so is no longer controlled by TAMA).  
 
 
5.1   Smallholder rents in 2009/10 
 
      We now consider smallholder rents in the 2009/10 season. Table 9 shows that the 
net margin in 2009/10 for smallholders using credit increased from 52.20 cents per kg to 63.59 
cents per kg. This is mainly due to the increase in auction floor prices from $1.10 to $1.80 
compensating for the substantial increases in smallholders costs of production. For example, 
the six-year period has shown a doubling (in dollar terms) of nursery and land costs, loan costs 
(where lower interest rates have been offset by an increase in fertiliser costs by a factor of 2.3), 
and chigaffa costs.  Marketing preparation costs have increased (in dollar terms) by a factor of 
2.4. We find that smallholders’ net margins were indeed in the region of 30% (as assumed in 
the costs of production that informed the minimum prices on the auction floors).
41 Overall, then, 
in nominal terms, we find smallholder margins have increased by 11.39 cents per kg. However, 
in real terms, when we use the rural consumer price index to deflate smallholder earnings in 
2009/10, we find a loss of purchasing power of 14.3% from net burley income between 2003/04 




Table 9 – Smallholder rents in the 2009/10 season 
 
SMALLHOLDER BURLEY COSTS OF PRODUCTION 2009/2010 SEASON KASUNGU 
BASED ON   500kg  /  1 acre  / 5 bales / $ 1.80 per Kg  
  150 kwacha = 1 US $ 
Kwacha  Kwacha per kg  Cents per kg 
1.  PRODUCTION COSTS 
Total nursery and land cost  37586.67  75.17  50.12 
Total loan costs  8962.41  17.92  11.95 
Total chigaffa costs  15100  30.20  20.13 
Total Production Costs  61649.08  123.30  82.20 
2. MARKETING COSTS 
Total marketing preparation Costs  18325  36.65  24.43 
Total deductions on floors  6022.5  12.05  8.03 
Total other costs  1312.85  2.63  1.75 
Total Marketing Costs  25660.35  51.32  34.21 
TOTAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING COSTS (1+2)  87309.43  174.62  116.41 
                                                 
41 Fertiliser subsidies were not provided for cash crop production in the 2009/10 season.  
42 We used the national Rural Consumer Price Index supplied by the National Statistics Office, Zomba, 
and included only 6 months inflation for both 2004 and 2010 (reflecting the timing of payments during the 
marketing season).   
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GROSS PROCEEDS   
   
135,000.00   270.00  180.00 
BASED ON   500kg  /  1 acre  / 5 bales / $ 1.80 per Kg  
NET RETURN TO FARMER  47690.57  95.38  63.59 
 
Source: Author’s estimates, see Annex 3 for full details 
 
 
5.1.1  Marketing channels  
 
      In 2009/10 the marketing channels for burley included the auction floors, district 
markets and IBs. District markets are run by AHL and have operated as a mini auction floor 
since 2006/07. The rationale for opening district-level markets was to reduce farmers’ transport 
costs, reduce the expensive and lengthy delays at the three main auction floors, increase the 
speed that farmers access income (reducing the interest some pay), and, importantly to reduce 
the  attraction  of  the  cross-border  trade.  For  example,  in  the  2008/09  season  Alliance  One 
operated a ‘silent auction’ for contracted tobacco at Chinkhoma. In 2009/10 all the major leaf 
merchants did so. 
 
      Just as in 2003/04, the choice of marketing channels alters smallholder profitability 
considerably.  Annex 4 compares the net margins of smallholder burley production in 2009/10 
when marketed through the three channels: the auction floors; district markets; and IBs. Just as 
with the 2003/04 comparison, Annex 4 uses the same intensive model of smallholder burley 
production as Annex 3 but without the use of credit.  
 
      Annex 4 suggests that a non-credit grower in 2009/10 receives a net return of 76 
cents per kg from the auction floors (compared to 59 cents per kg in 2003/04). However, selling 
burley  at  a  district  market  (Chinkhoma)  improves  the  return  to  88  cents  per  kg  through  a 
considerable reduction in transport costs (from 13.47 cents per kg to 1 cent per kg).  The overall 
higher prices on the auction floors (from $1.10 to $1.80) also allow IBs to pay higher prices (90 
cents per kg up from 37 cents in 2003/04) to farmers who desire instant access to cash or a 
convenient channel to sell low grade leaf.  
 
    Overall, then, in nominal terms, a non-credit grower using the auction floors improved 
their net margin by 17 cents per kg between 2003/04 and 2009/10. Growers using the cross-
border trade/district markets improved theirs by 45.77 cents per kg, and those utilising IBs by 
14.22 cents, during this time period. These substantial differences in the change in nominal 
profit between the different channels are reflected in the extent to which each channel provided 
a real terms gain or loss: a non-credit grower using the auction floors realised a 4.1% loss in 
purchasing power from burley  income (equivalent to 2.61 kwacha  per kg);  those using the 
cross-border trade/district markets realised a 48.9% gain in purchasing power (equivalent to 
48.83 kwacha per kg); whilst those using IBs realised a real terms gain of 20.28 kwacha per kg.   
 
 
5.1.2   Levies for tobacco-related institutions in 2009/10 
 
    Table  10  illustrates  the  levies  and  deductions  on  the  auction  floors  in  the  2009/10 
season. It shows that the Auction Holdings levy has reduced from 3.25% of gross proceeds to 
2.5%, but that this has been offset by a TCC classification levy (as this institution now performs 
this function). We notice that the TCC’s core levy, the Hessian Levy (now collected by TAMA), 
the ARET levy and the Growers’ Organisation (TAMA/NASFAM) levy have all stayed the same.  
 
Table 10 - Levies and deductions on the auction floors in 2010   




TCC levy  
 
 
0.10 cents per kg  
AHL levy  
 
2.5% of gross proceeds  
Hessian levy (collected by TAMA) 
 
0.30 cents per bale 
ARET levy 
 
1% of gross proceeds 
TAMA/NASFAM levy  
 
0.70 cents per kg 
TCC classification levy  
 
0.35 cents per kg 
Witholding Tax of 7 percent  
 
Not applied to smallholders 
Transport   Variable  -    In  2009/10  NASFAM  charged 
Kw1870 per bale from Kasungu to Lilongwe 
 
 
Source: Tobacco Control Commission, interviews 
 
      In  2009/10  these  deductions  amounted  to  8.03  cents  per  kg,  which  represents 
12.63 percent of the smallholder’s net return, almost identical to the 12.4 percent in the 2003/04 
season. Unfortunately, the research was unable to elicit information regarding the rents accrued 
by leaf merchants through the processing and exporting burley tobacco in 2009/10. 
 
 
5.2  Governance in 2009/10 
 
      We find substantial changes in the governance of the supply thread in 2009/10. 
First, Stancom and Dimon – the second and third largest leaf merchants globally – merged in 
2006, creating Alliance One. In Malawi, this created a tussle at the top of the tobacco tree. As 
we’ve seen, previously Limbe Leaf controlled the cartel on the auction floors, but in the 2007 
season Alliance One took over this role by pricing Limbe Leaf out of the market. Prices went as 
high  as  US$9.50  per  kg.  In  addition,  three  further  players  have  entered  the  market.  First, 
government, through Auction Holdings, created a purchasing company – Malawi Leaf – to try 
and increase competition on the floors. In the first few days the company bought up to 26% of 
the tobacco sold on the auction floors at higher prices than Limbe Leaf and Alliance One. In the 
following weeks this market share slumped to less than 1%. Malawi Leaf encountered two major 
problems:  processing  and  export  markets.  Malawi  Leaf  had  to  rent  processing  capacity  off 
Alliance One. This was expensive and can cause substantial delays. Malawi Leaf also exported 
some of its tobacco to Egypt. As Van Donge (2002) highlights, the Egyptian market is mainly for 
low-quality burley tobacco, and companies there have a reputation for not honouring contracts. 
The  second  new  player  on  the  floors  –  Premium  TAMA  –  is  a  subsidiary  of  the  Tobacco 
Association of Malawi (TAMA). This new entrant started construction of its own processing plant 
(to overcome larger firms’ control of capital goods). And third, a long-standing agricultural input 
company – ATC – started to buy burley on the floors.
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      Whilst  the  new  players  have  increased  competition,  buying  tobacco  in  Malawi 
remains a structured affair. Informants suggest that the new share out is 30% AO, 29% LL, 14% 
AL, 14% Premium/TAMA, 10% Malawi Leaf, and 3% ATC. However, informants suggest there 
is now greater competition, with smaller firms able to increase their market share each day 
without being reprimanded and intimidated by the larger companies. This was not the case in 
2003/04.  Finally,  all  three  international  merchants  are  now  strongly  connected  to  global 
manufacturers: Alliance One supplies Philip Morris; Limbe Leaf supplies BAT; and Africa Leaf is 
                                                 
43 Two further small companies in the 2009/10 season were the Associated Tobacco Company and RWJ 
Wallace  
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5.3   Systemic efficiency in 2009/10 
 
      The final component of the 2009/10 season is systemic efficiency. Here we find a 
substantial  increase  in  the  amount  of  smallholder  burley  now  produced  through  contract 
farming. For example, in 2008 and 2009 40 and 60 million kgs of burley were produced through 
contract farming, respectively (representing roughly 30% of total burley production). In 2010, 
this dropped back to 40 million kgs (20% of the crop). Part of this expansion has been due to 
the  merger  of  Dimon  and  Stancom  in  2005.  Alliance  One  took  over  contracting  NASFAM 
farmers and expanded operations into Ntchisi, Zomba and Namwera. More recently, Alliance 
One broke their tie-up with NASFAM and now use their own clubs with extension workers and 
credit  supplied  through  tripartite  agreements  with  Opportunity  International  and  the  National 
Bank.  
 
      Contract farming has become a sensitive issue within the industry. Leaf merchants 
wish to further expand contract farming, but this is being resisted by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and TCC. As the simple diagram in Figure 6 suggests, a complete shift to direct contracting has 
repercussions for numerous ancillary industries – such as fertiliser suppliers, transporters, and 
commercial  graders.  Moreover,  pressure  to  disband  the  floors  underestimates  their  role  in 
facilitating the operation of the industry in a highly capital-constrained context. Auction Holdings 
recovers the costs of goods and services from growers’ gross proceeds on behalf of institutions 
via the centralised system of sales. Liberalising the auction floor system may circumscribe the 
ability of independent credit, input and transport providers to offer services to smallholders (thus 
limiting competition, but creating further market opportunities for the leaf companies). Moreover, 
it is understandable if government is reticent about contract farming becoming the main mode of 
tobacco  marketing  due  to  the  alleged  smuggling  that  took  place  when  companies  were 
contracting large-scale estates.  
 
    Figure 6 – Depiction of contract farming with a ‘silent’ auction 
 
  Simple depiction of contract 




Processing     
 
                                      




     Leaf companies




        Source: Author’s illustration 
 
Nevertheless, there are signs that an increasing proportion of smallholder burley will be contract 
farmed.  For  example,  all  buyers  now  operate  silent  auctions  at  the  new  district  markets.  
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Moreover, if there is a disagreement on price with contracted tobacco, the TCC is not involved – 
only the buyer and grower meet to resolve the problem which, growers claim, is much faster 
and more efficient. There are also two further reasons why contract farming is set to increase. 
First, that contracted burley has been receiving higher prices as the quality of the crop is better. 
And most importantly, it allows leaf companies full traceability of the crop (especially important 
for Philip Morris who require considerable oversight in terms of chemicals, NTRM and child 
labour). A summary of the major changes in the supply thread between 2003/04 and 2009/10 is 
shown in Table 11.  
 
 
Table 11 – Summary of major changes in supply thread 2003/04 to 2009/10 
 
Institutional framework  Creation of district markets 
 
Introduction of minimum prices and greater government intervention 
 
More credence concerns (CC32 bill, green tobacco sickness) 
   
Rents  The net margin of growers using credit and the auction floors increased by 11.39 cents per 
kg in nominal terms. This represents a real terms loss of purchasing power of 8.04 kwacha 
per kg.  
 
The net margin of growers not using credit but using the auction floors increased by 17 
cents per kg in nominal terms. This represents a real terms loss of purchasing power of 
2.61 kwacha per kg.    
 
The  net  margin  of  growers  not  using  credit  and  using  the  cross-border  trade  /  district 
markets increased by 45.77 cents in nominal terms. This represents a real terms gain in 
purchasing power of 48.83 kwacha per kg.   
 
The net margin of growers using intermediate buyers increased by 14.22 cents in nominal 
terms. This represents a real terms gain in purchasing power of 20.28 kwacha per kg.   
 
Institutional levies remain broadly similar (at around 12.5% of smallholders net margins) 
   
Governance  Alliance One is now the dominant leaf buyer 
 
New leaf buyers have increased competition on the auction floors 
 
Greater conflict in the industry between government and leaf merchants 
   
Systemic efficiency  Increasing  amounts  of  smallholder  burley  produced  through  contract  farming  (with 
implications for auction floors and ancillary industries) 
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6.   CONCLUSION 
 
      Despite considerable changes in the structure of the smallholder burley tobacco 
supply thread in recent years, little academic attention has focused on the dynamics between 
international leaf merchants and government, both of whom claim to have the best interests of 
Malawi’s smallholder growers at heart. The comparison here suggests that government efforts 
contributed to a 63% increase in smallholder producer prices on the auction floors between 
2003/04  and  2009/10  (considerably  higher  than  the  15%  increase  in  producer  prices  in 
neighbouring Mozambique over this time period - FAO, 2011). Due to increased production 
costs this only led to a 22% increase in net margins for smallholder growers using credit and the 
auction floors. And when we deflate the 2009/10 kwacha figures using the Rural Consumer 
Price Index, we find this represents a loss of purchasing power from burley income of 14.3%. In 
contrast, growers not using credit and utilising the CBT / districts markets, and IBs, saw a real 
terms increases in purchasing power (of 48.83 and 20.29 kwacha per kg, respectively).  
 
      Moreover, government action in tackling the cartel on the auction floors has led to 
considerable conflict within the industry.  Whilst these efforts have led to a slight increase in 
competition (and a slight reduction in the companies’ control over capital goods), it remains to 
be seen whether such a confrontational stance with the main leaf merchants will bear fruit in the 
longer term. The trust and open communication channels between actors evident in the 2003/04 
season no longer exist.
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      The most significant structural change  in the sector  over  the period considered 
here has been the rapid shift towards contract farming. Thus, the burley supply thread in Malawi 
is increasingly a captive value chain. However, this is not so say that smallholders won’t be able 
to benefit substantially from such arrangements (for a detailed discussion of the opportunities 
and risks from contract farming see Prowse, 2010). Contract farming can allow access to a 
reliable market, can provide guaranteed and stable pricing structures, and most importantly can 
provide access to credit, inputs, production and marketing services (seed, fertiliser, training, 
extension, transport, even land preparation). On a wider note, it can also transfer technology 
and skills (particularly for higher-risk crops which resource-poor farmers might avoid), and can 
support  farmers  in  meeting  vital  standards.  Most  importantly,  contract  farming  can  provide 
higher incomes.  But just as there are numerous opportunities from contract farming, there are 
also  numerous direct  and indirect risks for small-scale producers (and, in some cases, non 
participants – see Prowse, 2010).   
 
      The  position  this  article  takes  is  that  successful  contract  farming  arrangements 
often  rely  not  just  on  technical  expertise,  an  appropriate  choice  of  scheme,  and  good 
contractual  design,  but  the  explicit  involvement  of  numerous  third  parties.  Such  actors  can 
arbitrate contract design and implementation schedules, provide quality assurance of inputs, 
and ensure that product characteristics, and payment schedules are fair. In essence, contract 
farming is a relationship that can be improved and enhanced through open, frank dialogue, and 
through advice, encouragement, and, in some cases, the oversight of authorised third parties. 
Trust and goodwill in a relationship can easily be replaced by doubt and mistrust. Third parties 
can provide services and support to make a breakdown in communication and possible conflict 
less  likely.  The  extent  to  which  third  parties  can  play  this  role  in  Malawi  is  currently  very 
uncertain: all contracted tobacco still has to pass over the floors in a ‘silent’ auction. Moreover, 
government’s attempts to ‘discipline’ firms only seems to be antagonising companies who now 
appear to be reneging on their long-standing ‘obligation’ to purchase all the tobacco Malawi can 
produce (thus contributing to worse balance of payments deficits). Put simply, there appears to 
be a need for an independent institutional broker, trusted by both sides, to repair the damage 
caused to the industry. The memorable title of Jaffee’s (2003) paper – Standing on One Strong 
                                                 
44  Furthermore,  considerable  challenges  for  the  industry  remain  regarding  credence  factors  and  the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  
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Leg is Better Than on None – is prescient here, as, at least in the short term, without tobacco 
Malawi will fall. 
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